"Sutta-DE-central" the never ending stories of foolishness

[Johann]

I am not delighted that I need you to inform you another time. Since I got some clear "expressions" for from the runner of the Sutta decentralizing and making Suttas to common stuff project SuttaCentral :

Bhikkhu Sujato

You mentioned about the copyright. Actually, we have a copyright page ready, it is just not uploaded yet. Essentially our policy is this:

1. Ancient texts are in public domain.
2. Anything created by SuttaCentral is released under CC0 (equivalent to public doman).
3. Translations are in accordance with the pre-existing copyright licence, if there is one.

Since there is a list of contributors I also feel the need to make this public. So you are able to inform them (as it might be that they are not aware what happens with their gifts) or to abstain, to give them teachings of the Buddha, since they seem to work against right view and basics like "'There is what is given, what is offered, what is sacrificed. There are fruits & results of good & bad actions." and seek refuge in "righteous taken" rather to teach people not to take what is not given.

    “And how is one made pure in three ways by mental action? There is the case where a certain person is not covetous. He does not covet the belongings of others and just takes what is in public domain, thinking, ‘O, that what belongs to others would be mine!’ He bears no ill will and is not corrupt in the resolves of his heart. [He thinks,] ‘May these beings be free from animosity, free from oppression, free from trouble, and may they look after themselves with ease!’ He has right view and is not warped in the way he sees things: ‘There is what is given taken under public domain, what is offered given to public domain, what is sacrificed common possession. There are fruits & results of good & bad actions and no fruits form taking what is under public domain. There is this world & the next world, but who cares, we will not remember. Carpe diem as long there is something left!. There is mother & father but we have not ask them for anything and what they did is there stuff.. There are spontaneously reborn beings; there are have maybe been maybe brahmans & contemplatives who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world & the next after having directly known & realized it for themselves.’ This is how one is made pure common in three ways by mental action.”

    — AN 10.176

Note: this is a not allowed modification, but since it might make some irritation visible, I guess the author will have no problem with such a showcase. Bold text is added.

This is the list of "co-workers" and supporter of the "getting Dhamma under Public Domain" undertaking of the Sutta(de)central project:

Bhante Sujato
John Kelly
Bhante Jhanarato
Bhante Nandiya

    Bhikkhu Bodhi
    Bhikkhu Anālayo
    Bhikkhu Pāsādika
    Bhikkhu Ñāṇatusita
    Buddhist Studies Review
    Sāmaṇerī Dhammadinnā
    Bhikkhu Khemacāro
    Bhikkhu Yuttadhammo
    Bhikkhu Jaganātha
    Bhikkhunī Nibbidā
    Bhikkhu Araṇavihārī
    Shravasti Dhammika
    Bhikkhu Ānandajoti
    Marcus Bingenheimer
    Binh Anson
    Alex Genaud
    Charles Muller
    Kumarī Jayawardena
    Buddhist Society of WA
    Buddhist Library (Sydney)
    John Nishinaga
    Amaradasa Liyanagamage

So please inform them, and/or stay away from them, if they even don't understand what they are doing.
Remakable is that most of them are also Dhamma seller, dealer or people who make a livelihood out of translation and teaching Dhamma... or simply social workers and slaves. Effect has its cause.

Note! That some are listed here, does not really mean that they are on the wrong path or reject Buddhas teachings, but they are involved and maybe not aware of it.

 

[Johann]

Hi Johann,

I’m not sure what your problem here is. “Public Domain” just means that anyone can use it for anything, there is no control or ownership. CC0 is an attempt to come as close to Public Domain as current laws allow.

Dear Bhikkhu Sujato,

Yes, I am sure that you don’t understand the problem. People do not understand the different between given and taken. There are agreements within ordinary people (hunters and collectors) how to share the taken from common resources and of cause they need a field of common hunting ground. But in regard to right view, next to what is taken and thrown away , there are gifts, there is what is scarified.

If you just take form common hunting ground, of course you might be only able to share for the common hunting grounds. If you have received a gift (Note: not everybody as capable to receive a gift), that you will feel responsible for it, take care of it, and share as good possible if you like to share.
So if you work is dedicated for the common possession, fine. But if you throw all the valued things in the steam of common sense and common use, then you will not receive much valued gifts in the future.

I don’t know what should be the problem, if you put your work under your “domain” and share it as a gift and not declare it as something free to take.
The teachings of the Buddha are at least in the “domain” of the Sangha (8 pairs) and you should think twice, if you can act with that possession in this way. If your work is just a worldly work, directed to the world, that everything might be fine and it will stay and lead further in the world.

If you consciously dedicate your work for the noble Sangha, your mind directed to Nibbana and gratitude for your parents, ancestor, teachers and spiritual teachers as well as object of dedication, your work would be according what you should work for as a Bhikkhu and it would be work and gifts which are acceptable by people who abstain from what is not given. You could even, step by step, clean dirty things, so that a real literary SuttaCentral might be reestablished.

You should request (which you can not do in direction of everybody, specially lay people) the use, receive it consciously and dedicate it proper.

How can you ever teach basics to laypeople, if you do not value basic things for your self?

It would be not easy to recollect the teachings in a righteous way but it is the not easy that makes a person and an undertaking a special.

Of course, that all does not mean that we will forget about the hungry ghost and of course everything is dedicated for them as well. Those who have given in previous existences will be able to nourish on it as well.

Bhikkhu! Receive consciously and share and give consciously with whom you are ever allowed!! These are furthermore not all!

One fault causes 100 other faults and the stream will not end till we don’t abstain from the fault at first place.

I would really be happy to be able to dedicate all my work for SuttaCentral if it would be not clearly outside the frame of the Sangha and clearly dedicated in direction of the world and not Nibbana.

If you give,
give with mudita dedicated for Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha and the direction Nibbana
give with karuna dedicated for those who do not have found refugee in the 3 gems yet
give with metta dedicated for those not capable to receive your gift
give with upekkha dedicated for those who even develop ill will out of your gift.

It is not possible to make a dirty stream clear with a little cup of clear water, but it is possible to scoop, with patient and step by step, some clean water on the fordable and silent places of a dirty stream.

And if people recognize your good work, they will even share there stored water bottles, thinking: “This righteous acting person with understanding the basics of right view, is worthy to receive gifts”, let us dedicate it for the Sangha and let us assume him as a part of them.

Stay on earth and leave stupid ideas of common rights and equality.

Let me know as soon as Stutta – de – central has grown to SuttaCentral, has an owner and a worthy object to dedicate gifts. It would be really outstanding to find such in our now day wired grown world. “You can!…”

_()_

Maybe useful for one and the other, to understand the basics. I once wrote some words and they have been generously translated by Moritz R. into English as well: “Labour makes (you) free!?” Giving, taking and the “new” world. May you be able to receive this gift even it is not the cream but still can nourish you well.

Don’t forget after you have done some work the traditional dedication, and if it does not fit to your work, don’t share it.

Puññassidāni katassa
Yānaññāni katāni me
Tesañca bhāgino hontu
Sattānantāppamāṇaka.

May all beings — without limit, without end —
have a share in the merit just now made,
and in whatever other merit I have made.

Ye piyā guṇavantā ca
Mayhaṃ mātā-pitādayo
Diṭṭhā me cāpyadiṭṭhā vā
Aññe majjhatta-verino;

Those who are dear & kind to me —
beginning with my mother & father —
whom I have seen or never seen;
and others, neutral or hostile;

Sattā tiṭṭhanti lokasmiṃ
Te-bhummā catu-yonikā
Pañc’eka-catuvokārā
Saṃsarantā bhavābhave:

beings established in the cosmos —
the three realms, the four modes of birth,
with five, one, or four aggregates —
wandering on from realm to realm:

Ñātaṃ ye pattidānam-me
Anumodantu te sayaṃ
Ye cimaṃ nappajānanti
Devā tesaṃ nivedayuṃ.

If they know of my dedication of merit,
may they themselves rejoice,
And if they do not know,
may the devas inform them.

Mayā dinnāna-puññānaṃ
Anumodana-hetunā
Sabbe sattā sadā hontu
Averā sukha-jīvino

By reason of their rejoicing
in my gift of merit,
may all beings always live happily,
free from animosity.

Khemappadañca pappontu
Tesāsā sijjhataṃ subhā.

May they attain the Serene State,
and their radiant hopes be fulfilled.

[Johann]

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So that is what you got by giving to people who serve the world.
[1] An approve and encouragement that Sangha Donations are at least to be sold and placed on the marked and all the other instances the wold offers for worldly gain.
[2] Approve and encouragement to do what ever you like with it modify it and call it the teachings of the Buddha, legally and approved
[3] They reject any, any responsibility for the work and wasted energies for their work. So its just for "lain" (game, playing around in Thai/Khmer language)
[4] naturally are ashamed and don't like to bothered, of course.

After all, it is suttacentral who gives and takes, no one knows what and who sutta central is at least. A legal person? A myths? A reincanation of Robin Hood?

And like all people who encourage others to have rights to take, rather to teach them abstain from what is not given and gratitude, they encourage people to reject the owner rights of others:

The original texts of Buddhism in Pali, Chinese, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and other languages, are in the public domain. We believe that copyright assertions regarding such material have no legal basis. Nevertheless, we endeavor to use all materials with permission.

Maybe they believe that he texts have been carved in stone tablet by a supernatural being and so there is naturally no labor of others involved, who maybe don't give things.

This two fractions of Brahmans are really hopeless lost in their try to make Dhamma an worldly common creative or legal trademark.
I am not sure it they are aware, but it, it really does not look good and they don't like to lend an ear.

Friends! So much great work, so much money support and faith and finally such silly decisions. But that away, you are doing great work, so stand straight and give it with two hands consciously and with a dedication.

Dhamma does not keep people in the world so, don't fear to let go of common suffering and its roots.

To throw the Dhamma into to jungle, is really not a great idea. Is that all gratitude use you are able to develop in regard of it? It's really not about what others do, its about your intention and not of those who take not to speak of those who would receive what is given.

As for a Bhikkhu and Bhikkhuni, he/she would be not able to touch something that is in Public domain. Even the most do not care about it, still there could be some left.

Friends! 

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1. means that you approve that this Dhamma is placed on porn sites of, in Disco's, in amusement medias as well
2. means that the work is of no moral value and the producer are not of special virtue
3. you approve a deliberated wrong imagination of author (Dhamma, Buddha)
4. You give it sectarians and slanderer free to use and ans modifiable, you approve such
5. Actually you limit the "extraction, dissemination, use and reuse" for people who don't approve such ways
6. You give it free to any use at all in the database industrie
7. You approve ever use (including misuse!) with it

Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise, including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.

As for Laws in some European countries, such a point is even for a law side not legal, thinking on consumer protection and capital laws, even if popular in internet, such has no foothold anywhere.
I don't need to speak about rejecting responsibility from a Dhammic side and its a sign for people of integrity that you take up responsibility for their work, full and even more as worldly laws would demand.

Not to speak about the end of "Evam", maybe we can change it in "googlam me sutaṃ", or "this have I found"...

samsaraṇaṃ gacchāmi...

[Johann]

Btw. the Pali Texts, not sure about the other, do not look like if they are really in Public domain. It might be so for the PTS Version, but the text seems to be more of origin from the "Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana CD published by the Vipassana Research Institute", but I might be wrong. So the to declare the origin of the texts would be very care full in regard of people to be informed it they are really acting good or build on maybe not so good ways.

Could not find any information as a very vague:

"The original texts of Buddhism in Pali, Chinese, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and other languages, are in the public domain." and a link to the game-masters legal resource."

Is it really like that, or are they just taken and put as such?

[Johann]

Maybe its good to recollect a downfall rule, as it would be really sad to do such, for the sake of Samsara. Just to see how serious taken what is not given or modify what is not given actually is and why people usually ask.

Very important is also the relation to Sangha-property, which is not counted as given and so after all, can not be taken and handed out by single Bhikkhus.

As for putting "other" legal measures under something, it is actually the same like moving border stones.

Pārājika

2. Should any bhikkhu, in what is reckoned a theft, take what is not given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness — just as when, in the taking of what is not given, kings arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, saying, "You are a robber, you are a fool, you are benighted, you are a thief" — a bhikkhu in the same way taking what is not given also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.

This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, the most complex in the Pāṭimokkha and requires the most explanation — not because stealing is a concept especially hard to understand, but because it can take so many forms. The Canon treats the issue in a case-by-case fashion that resists easy summary. To further complicate matters, the Commentary's discussion of this rule is extremely prolix and deviates frequently from the Canon's in both major and minor ways. Because the deviations are so numerous, we will focus solely on the major ones.

The Vibhaṅga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors.

    1) Object: anything belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.
    2) Perception: One perceives the object as belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.
    3) Intention: One decides to steal it.
    4) Effort: One takes it.

Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense. However, the severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is —

    5) The value of the object.

Object. For an object to qualify as what is not given — the rule's term for anything that may be the object of a theft — it must belong to someone else: "not given, not forfeited, not abandoned/discarded; guarded, protected, claimed (§ — literally, 'viewed as "mine"'), possessed by someone else." In all of the Vibhaṅga's cases under this rule, that "someone else" is either an individual human being or a group of human beings. The question of property belonging to the Saṅgha logically fits here, but because the topic is fairly complex we will discuss it as a special case below.

Because items that have been given away or discarded do not fulfil the factor of object here, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes a discarded object — such as rags from a pile of refuse — or unclaimed items from a wilderness. The Commentary, in some of its examples, includes items given up for lost under "abandoned," but this interpretation has to be heavily qualified. If the owner retains a sense of ownership for the lost item, it would fall under the term claimed, and thus would still count as not given. Only if the owner abandons all sense of ownership would it genuinely count as abandoned.

The Vinita-vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus committed no offense.

The Commentary adds that if people are guarding an object as the property of a location — for example, an offering to a Buddha image, cetiya, or other sacred place — the object would also qualify as "not given" under this rule. Although the Vibhaṅga mentions property of this sort under NP 30 and Pc 82, for some reason it doesn't mention it here. Nevertheless, the Commentary's judgment on this point reflects a custom that had become widespread by its time, that of giving valuable items to a cetiya (this includes Buddha images) and dedicating them not to the Saṅgha but to the cetiya. Some medieval Indian Buddhist inscriptions express the idea that the cetiya or the Buddha relics (if any) within the cetiya actually own such objects, but the Commentary states that these objects have an owner simply in the sense that human beings are watching over them for the purpose of the cetiya. The jewels decorating the reliquary of the Sacred Tooth in Kandy or the offerings to the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok, for example, would fall under this category. According to the Commentary, the Saṅgha is duty-bound to care for such items but has no rights of ownership over them. In its discussion both of this rule and of Pv.XIX, it states that items given to the Saṅgha may be used for the purpose of the cetiya — for example, to contribute to its decoration or upkeep — but items given to the cetiya may not be used for the purpose of the Saṅgha.

From the Commentary's discussion of this type of ownership, it would appear that if there are no longer any human beings watching over a cetiya, the items donated to it would no longer count as having an owner and thus could be removed for safekeeping, preferably to another cetiya. Any bhikkhu who took such items for himself, however, would be risking the wrath of the devas who might be guarding the cetiya. This is why it is traditional in such cases to conduct a ceremony formally requesting the permission of any guardian devas, at the same time promising not to take such items for one's own use.

Items belonging to common animals or petas are not covered by this rule. On this point, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below.

Perception. For the act of taking what is not given to count as theft, one must also perceive the object as not given. Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it is not given, if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him permission to take his things on trust, there is no offense even if the assumption about the trust proves to be a misperception. Also, a bhikkhu who takes things from the Community's common stores, on the assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense even if the assumption proves false.

The Vinita-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu, spotting some objects during the day, returns to steal them at night. However, instead of taking the objects he spotted, he ends up taking some possessions of his own. He earns a dukkaṭa for his efforts.

None of the texts discuss the possible case in which one might be in doubt as to whether the object in question is not given, perhaps because the compilers felt that the factor of intention, discussed next, would not apply in such cases. Thus it would not be an offense under this rule. However, the wise policy when one is in doubt about an item's ownership would be not to take the item for one's own, or at most to take it on loan, as explained below.

Intention. The act of taking what is not given, even when one perceives it as not given, counts as theft only if one's intention is to steal it. Thus, as the non-offense clauses say, a bhikkhu incurs no offense if he takes an object temporarily or on trust. On these points, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below. Also, the Vinita-vatthu rules that a bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner, commits no offense.

The Commentary discusses two cases of taking an item with a conditional intent (parikappāvahāra): placing a condition on the article, and placing a condition on the place. It illustrates the first case with the example of a bhikkhu entering a dark storeroom and taking a sack full of items, thinking, "If the sack contains cloth, I'll steal it; if it contains just thread, I won't." In this case, if the sack does indeed contain cloth, then it was stolen the moment the bhikkhu moved the sack from its place (see below). If it contains just thread, and he returns it to its place, he commits no offense. If, however, the bhikkhu takes the sack thinking, "I'll steal whatever is in the sack," the Commentary maintains that he is not guilty of stealing until he finds out what the sack contains and then picks it up again, but this case does not really fit under this category, as the bhikkhu has actually placed no condition on the article and so stole it when he first picked it up.

Placing a condition on the place means thinking, "If I can take this item past such-and-such a place (such as a gateway), I'll steal it; if anyone sees me beforehand, I'll pretend that I'm just looking at it and will return it to its place." Because one has not definitely decided to steal it when first picking it up, the theft is committed only when one takes the item past the determined place.

Effort. Assuming that all of the above conditions are met — the object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to someone else, and one intends to steal it — if one then takes it, that constitutes stealing. The question then arises as to precisely what acts constitute taking.

The Vibhaṅga, instead of giving a systematic answer to this question, provides a long list of possible situations and then defines how taking is defined in each case. Simply reading through the list can require some patience, and it's easy to sympathize with the bhikkhus in the past who had to memorize it. Here, to shorten the discussion, we will reverse its order, listing first the actions that qualify as taking and then the situations to which the actions apply. Actions requiring only minor clarification will be explained in the list; those requiring extended discussion will be explained below.

Moving the object from its place: objects buried in the ground; sitting on the ground; sitting on another object sitting on the ground; hanging from a place above ground, such as a peg or clothesline; floating, flying, or dropping in mid-air; sitting in a boat; sitting in a vehicle; an object that one has caused another person to drop; footless animals, animals that one might pick up or push from their place (according to the Commentary, this also covers larger footed animals that are lying down); objects that one has been asked to guard. The Vibhaṅga makes clear that items in a vehicle also count as taken when the vehicle is moved from its place.

"Cutting off" a fistful: objects inside a container. According to the Commentary, this means reaching into the container and grabbing, say, a fistful of coins in such a way that the coins in the fist do not touch any of the other coins in the container. In this case, the taking would be accomplished before the object was removed from the container.

Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: objects inside a container; water or any liquid, whether in a container or not. Again, the Commentary states that the objects or liquid in one's vessel must not touch the remaining objects or liquid outside the vessel. And, again, in the case of taking objects or liquid situated in a container in this way, the taking would be accomplished before the objects or liquid were removed from the container.

Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: objects too long or large to be taken from a container in a vessel or fistful.

Drinking liquid from a container: This would apply to drinking from the container without moving the container from its place. If the container is moved from its place, that would constitute the taking. As with the fistful, the Commentary argues that the liquid is taken only when the liquid ingested does not make contact with the liquid not ingested. This can be done either by swallowing, by closing one's lips, or by removing one's mouth from the container.

Moving the object from one part of one's body to another: an object that one is already carrying before deciding to steal it. The Vibhaṅga recognizes five body parts here: head, upper torso, hip, and each of the hands. The Commentary defines head as anything above the neck; upper torso as anything below the head down, on the torso, to the level of the sternum, and on the arm, to the elbow; hip as the remainder of the body below the upper torso; and hand as the arm from the elbow on down. The Commentary notes that this definition applies only to cases where the owners have not asked one to carry the article for them. Neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary explains this condition, but a possible reason might be that if they have asked a bhikkhu to carry the article for them, without their intending for him to give it to someone else, it would count as guarded by him or deposited with him for safe keeping, and thus would fall under another category. If, on the other hand, they asked him to carry the object to give to someone else and he decided to take it for himself, the case would come under Deceit, discussed below.

Dropping the object: an object one is already carrying before deciding to steal it.

Causing the object to move a hairbreadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a boat or any similar vessel floating in water.

Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: water in a lake, canal, or reservoir.

Causing an animal to move all its feet: two-footed (this includes human beings, i.e., slaves), four-footed, many-footed animals. According to the Commentary, this applies whether one touches the animal or simply lures it or threatens it without touching it. If the animal is lying down, simply getting it to get up on its feet counts as taking it. In the case of helping a slave to escape from slavery, if the slave follows one's order or advice to escape, one is guilty of taking; but if one simply informs the slave of good ways to reach freedom or offers food or protection along the way, one incurs no offense.

Cutting down: plants growing in place, whether on dry land or in a body of water. The Commentary states that once the plant is cut totally through, then even though it doesn't yet fall down — as when a tree is entangled in the branches of neighboring trees — it is nevertheless taken.

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession: pieces of land (fields, orchards, building sites), buildings, objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safekeeping. (According to the Commentary, items loaned to a bhikkhu also fall into this category.) According to the Vibhaṅga, if a case of this sort goes to court, this type of taking is completed when the owner finally loses the case. The Vinaya-mukha adds that if the owner appeals the case after the first hearing, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses in the highest court to which he/she makes an appeal.

The discussion in the Commentary and Sub-commentary indicates that the two categories of "objects a bhikkhu has been asked to guard," and "objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safe keeping" differ in that in the latter case the object has been handed to the bhikkhu, whereas in the former it hasn't. This, however, does not fit with the Vibhaṅga, which in defining "deposited" uses the word upanikkhitaṃ, which in NP 18 means "placed down next to." A way to distinguish the two categories more closely in line with the Vibhaṅga would be to say that, in the latter case, the object is in such a location that the owner, in order to retrieve it, would have to ask the bhikkhu's permission to do so, whereas in the former he/she wouldn't. For example, an item placed in the bhikkhu's hut or a monastery storeroom would count as deposited with the bhikkhu — regardless of whether it had been handed to him — whereas an item set by the side of a public road — with the bhikkhu simply asked to watch over it for a short period of time — would count as an object he has been asked to guard.

Shifting a boundary marker: pieces of land. The Vinaya-mukha notes that this contradicts the preceding definition of how one takes a piece of land, as the owner might not even know that the marker had been moved, and would not necessarily give up ownership even if he/she saw a bhikkhu moving it. The Sub-commentary tries to explain the discrepancy by maintaining that shifting a boundary marker fulfils the factor of effort here only if the act of shifting the marker, in and of itself, induces the owner to give up any efforts to reclaim the land, but that would make this category superfluous. A better explanation would be that this definition of taking applies to attempts to lay claim to Saṅgha land, for otherwise — if land can be stolen only when the owner abandons ownership — then Saṅgha land could not be stolen, because there is no one acting for the Saṅgha of the Four Directions who could renounce once and for all any efforts to reclaim the land.

Exchanging lottery tickets: See Swindling, below.

Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: See Smuggling, below.

Of these various ways of taking, the Commentary devotes the most space to the first, "moving the object from its place." Its discussion is at odds with the Canon on many points, most notably in striking out the separate categories for taking large objects from a container (removing it entirely from the mouth of a container) and boats (causing them to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water), and simply subsuming them under this category. Although it may have regarded these separate categories as arbitrary, it introduces many arbitrary distinctions and inconsistencies of its own. Apparently its distinctions come from the ancient commentaries, for even Buddhaghosa expresses despair at trying to commit them all to writing. Here we will stick with the Canon's scheme for defining the act of taking, and focus on the parts of the Commentary's discussion that accord with the Canon. As for those that deviate from the Canon, only important deviations will be noted.

In general, the Commentary defines an object's place in terms of the directions in which it can be moved: up, down (as when an object sitting on sand can be pushed down into the sand), left, right, forward (toward the person taking it), and away. With reference to the last five of these actions, the place of the object is defined in three-dimensional terms: the space it occupies. Thus to take an object in any of these directions, one must push or pull it entirely outside of the coordinates of the space it initially occupied. However, with reference to lifting the object up, the place is defined in two-dimensional terms: the area of contact between the object and its support, whether that support is another object or the ground. Thus to take an object by lifting it, one only need lift it a hairbreadth from its support.

For example, a television set on a shelf is taken either when it is slid left along the shelf to the point where its right side is just left of where the left side used to be, or slid right to the point where its left side is just right of where the right side used to be, or lifted a hairbreadth off the shelf.

Because objects in the air have no support, the Commentary defines their space in three-dimensional terms no matter which direction they are moved. For instance, if one catches a piece of cloth being blown by the wind, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment one catches it. If one stops a flying peacock without touching it, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment it stops to hover. In either case, the object is taken when displaced any direction outside the coordinates of that space. In the case of the cloth, this could be done simply by dropping it. In the case of the peacock, it could be done by waving one's hands and getting it to fly in the desired direction. If the peacock happens to land on one's arm, it is taken when one moves it to another part of one's body or puts it down.

For animals swimming in water, it would make sense to define place in the same terms as birds flying in the air, but the Commentary insists that the entire body of water in which they are kept constitutes their place.

Objects on a living person — such as a bracelet on the person's arm — have the person's body as their place. Thus if, in trying to remove the bracelet, one pulls it up and down the arm, it is not yet taken. It is taken only when one removes it entirely from the hand. If one is stealing the person's clothes, they are taken only when removed from his/her body. If the person, stripped of the clothes, is still holding onto them, they are taken only when pulled from his/her hand.

For some objects, the Commentary defines place in terms that seem rather arbitrary. For instance, a robe on a line is taken when it is lifted a hairbreadth off the line, but for some reason if it is moved along the line it is not taken until it is ten or twelve fingerbreadths away from the area it originally occupied on the line. An object leaning against a wall has two places: the spot where it sits on the ground and the spot it touches on the wall. A vehicle's place is defined two-dimensionally: the spots where its wheels touch the ground (perhaps this is defined on analogy with the feet of an animal). An object tied to a post has that connection as an extra part of its place. Thus a pot tied by a chain to a post is not taken until it is removed from the area it occupied under the general definition above and either the chain is cut or the post pulled up. Although there is a certain logic to each of these cases, the added distinctions seem unnecessary complications added to an already complicated issue. For simplicity's sake there would seem every reason to stick with the general definition of place even in these special cases, although there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to prove or disprove the Commentary here.

However, as noted above, several of the Commentary's definitions of place clearly contradict the Vibhaṅga. In some cases, the contradiction is simple, as when the Commentary insists that an animal kept in an enclosure — a cow in a pen, a peacock in a garden — is taken not when its feet are moved, but only when removed from the enclosure. In other cases, the contradiction is more complex, in that the Commentary tries to define taking as "moving the object from its place" in cases where the Vibhaṅga defines the act of taking in other terms. For example, with an object sitting in the bottom of a container, it says that the object is taken when lifted a hairbreadth from the bottom, there being no need to remove the object from the container before it is considered taken. In the case of a boat, the Commentary defines the place of the boat in modified three-dimensional terms: the entire space where the boat displaces water. To take it by pushing it down in the water, the top of the boat has to sink lower than the level where the keel originally was; to take it by lifting it up, one need only lift it a hairbreadth above the water, there being no need to lift the keel to a point higher than where the highest point of the boat was. However, because the Vibhaṅga does not define the taking of boats or objects in containers in terms of "moving the object from its place," the Commentary's analysis of these possibilities is beside the point.

Other special cases in the Vibhaṅga include the following:

a. Swindling: Objects are being distributed by lot to the Community, and a bhikkhu takes the portion rightfully going to another bhikkhu. The Vibhaṅga offers no further explanation, but the Commentary states that the taking can be accomplished in various ways. If, after the drawing of the tickets, X puts his ticket in the place of Y's ticket before picking up Y's, the taking is accomplished when he picks up Y's. If he picks up Y's before putting his own ticket in its place, the taking is accomplished when he lets go of his own. If both tickets don't appear (they've been concealed?) and X gets Y to take X's portion, the taking is accomplished when he then picks up Y's portion. The underlying assumption in all this is that Y's portion belongs to him as soon as he has drawn the ticket for it. The Commentary adds that this exchange counts as theft regardless of whether X's portion is worth more than Y's, less than Y's, or the two portions are of equal value.

The Commentary to Mv.I.62 adds that if a bhikkhu claims higher seniority than is actually his in order to obtain better donations, he should be treated under this rule when, through this ruse, he obtains donations that should have gone to another bhikkhu. However, this type of action would appear to fall under Deceit, discussed below.

b. Smuggling: A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an import duty hides them as he goes through customs. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs area. The Vibhaṅga calculates the value of the object here, for the purpose of determining the seriousness of the offense, by the duty owed on it, and not its actual selling price.

The Vinita-vatthu states that there is no penalty if the bhikkhu goes through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to import duties among his effects. The Commentary adds that if a bhikkhu informs the customs official that he has an item subject to customs duty and yet the official decides not to collect the duty, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. It also states that if a bhikkhu goes through customs with a conditional intent — "If they ask to see my belongings, I'll pay the fee, but if they wave me through I won't" — then if the officials do wave him through without asking to see his belongings, he incurs no offense. At present, when people entering a country are asked to choose different passageways through a customs area, marked "Goods to declare" and "Nothing to declare," a bhikkhu with goods to declare who enters the "Nothing to declare" passageway cannot take advantage of this allowance for conditional intent, as he has already indicated an unconditional intent through his choice of a passageway.

The Vibhaṅga states that if, to avoid paying an import duty at a frontier, one crosses the frontier in such a way as to evade the customs area (§), one incurs only a dukkaṭa. At present, the civil law judges this sort of behavior as more reprehensible than slipping an item through customs, but from the point of view of the Vinaya the lesser penalty still holds. The Commentary says that this allowance applies only in cases when one evades the customs area by a distance of more than two leḍḍupātas — approximately 36 meters. (A leḍḍupāta is a unit of measure that appears frequently in the Canon and is defined as the distance a man of average stature can throw a clod of dirt underarm.)

The Vibhaṅga's position here is important to understand, for it has implications concerning the extent to which the evasion of other government fees and taxes would fall under this rule. The underlying assumption here seems to be that a dutiable item carried into a customs area is impounded by the king (or government). The payment of the duty is thus an act of recovering full ownership of the item. An item carried across the frontier without entering the customs area would not count as impounded, even though the king would probably claim the right to impound or even confiscate it if his agents apprehended the smuggler. Translated into modern terms, this would indicate that the evasion of other taxes claimed by the government — such as inheritance taxes — would incur the full penalty here only if the item being taxed was impounded on government property, and one evaded the tax by taking the item out of impoundment without paying the required fee. Otherwise, the penalty for tax evasion would be a dukkaṭa.

None of the texts discuss the question of contraband, i.e., articles that a customs official would confiscate outright rather than allow into a country after the payment of a fee. Apparently, such goods smuggled through a customs house would fall into this category, although — as even the payment of a fee would not legally get them through customs — their selling value would be the determining factor in calculating the seriousness of the offense.

c. Malfeasance: The Vinita-vatthu includes an unusual case in which a wealthy man with two heirs — a son and a nephew — tells Ven. Ajjuka, "When I am gone, show the place (where my treasure is buried) (§) to whichever of my heirs has the greater faith." After the man's death, Ven. Ajjuka sees that the nephew has the greater faith and so shows the place of the treasure to him. The nephew awards the Saṅgha with a large donation; the son accuses Ven. Ajjuka of having wrongfully deprived him of his rightful inheritance. On hearing this, Ven. Ānanda first accuses Ven. Ajjuka of a pārājika, but when the wealthy man's wishes are revealed, Ven. Upāli convinces Ven. Ānanda that Ven. Ajjuka committed no offense.

None of the texts discuss the details of this case, which seems to have postdated the Buddha's parinibbāna. The apparent assumption underlying the ruling is that when X dies, the inheritance he leaves to Y belongs to Y from the moment of X's death. Otherwise, the items in question would be ownerless until apportioned out among the heirs, and thus would not fulfill the factor of object under this rule. Also, the taking in this case would be accomplished in line with the Vibhaṅga's standard definition for taking with regard to the objects involved — and not necessarily when the cheated heir gives up trying to reclaim the inheritance — for in Ven. Ajjuka's case Ven. Ānanda was ready to impose a pārājika even though the son had not abandoned his claim.

d. Destruction of property: The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. Thus the simple destruction of property does not fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. The Vinita-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu intends to steal some grass belonging to the Community but ends up setting fire to it instead, thus incurring a dukkaṭa. The Commentary notes that this ruling applies only because the bhikkhu did not move the grass from its place. What this means is that if he had first taken the grass from its place and then destroyed it in any way, the factor of effort under this rule would have been fulfilled and — all other factors of a pārājika offense being present — he would have been guilty of the full offense.

Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:

a. False dealing: A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or uses counterfeit weights. The taking is accomplished when the counterfeit is accepted. This case, however, would seem to fall under the category of Deceit (see below), in that the counterfeit is a form of a lie. If the owner of an object accepts the counterfeit and hands over an object in return, the object cannot be described as stolen. However, the object obtained in trade in this way would have to be forfeited under NP 20, and the Community, if it felt so inclined, could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender (see BMC2, Chapter 20).

b. Robbery: Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object to give it to him. The taking is accomplished when the owner complies. This would not count as giving because the owner is not giving the item willingly.

c. Concealing: A bhikkhu finds an object left on the ground and, to deceive the owner, covers it with dirt or leaves with the intent of stealing it later. If the owner, after searching for the item, temporarily abandons the search and the bhikkhu then picks it up, it is stolen when removed from its base. If the owner, deciding that the item is lost, abandons it for good before the bhikkhu picks it up, the Commentary says that the bhikkhu is not guilty of theft but owes the owner compensation. We have discussed the topic of lost items above, under Object, and will discuss the topic of compensation below.

The value of the object. As stated above, any case of stealing counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined by the value of the object. This is the point of the phrase in the rule reading, "just as when there is the taking of what is not given, kings... would banish him, saying... 'You are a thief.'" In other words, for a theft to entail a pārājika it must be a criminal case, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved were worth at least five māsakas, a unit of money used at the time. Goods valued collectively at more than one māsaka but less than five are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one māsaka or less, grounds for a dukkaṭa. As the Commentary notes, the value of the articles is determined by the price they would have fetched at the time and place of the theft. As stated above, in the case of smuggling the Vibhaṅga measures the value of the object, for the purpose of this rule, as the duty owed on it, not the value of the object itself.

This leaves us with the question of how a māsaka would translate into current monetary rates. No one can answer this question with any certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the māsaka to the gold standard dates from the V/Sub-commentary, which sets one māsaka as equal to 4 rice grains' weight of gold. At this rate, the theft of an item worth 20 rice grains' (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or more would be a pārājika offense.

One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the items mentioned in the Vinita-vatthu as grounds for a pārājika when stolen — e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a raft, a handful of rice during a famine — would seem to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce of gold. However, we must remember that many items regarded as commonplace now may have been viewed as expensive luxuries at the time.

In addition, there is one very good reason for adopting the standard set by the V/Sub-commentary: It sets a high value for the least article whose theft would result in a pārājika. Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy ounce of gold or more, there can be no doubt that he has committed the full offense. When the item is of lesser value, there will be inescapable doubt — and when there is any doubt concerning a pārājika, the tradition of the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt: He is not expelled. A basic principle operating throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an offender go unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.

There is a second advantage to the V/Sub-commentary's method of calculation: its precision and clarity. Some people have recommended adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself — that if the theft would result in flogging, imprisonment, or banishment by the authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would constitute a pārājika — but this standard creates more problems than it would solve. In most countries the sentence is largely at the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value is only one among many taken into account when determining the penalty. This opens a whole Pandora's box of issues, many of which have nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken — the judge's mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, and so forth — issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of how to determine the penalty for a theft.

Thus the V/Sub-commentary's method of calculation has the benefits that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and — as noted above — it draws the line at a value above which there can be no doubt that the penalty is a pārājika.

The Commentary, arguing from two cases in the Vinita-vatthu, states that if a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the values of the different items are added together to determine the severity of the offense only if they were stolen as part of a single plan or intention. If they are stolen as a result of separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate offense whose severity depends on the value of the individual item(s) stolen in that act. This point is best explained with examples:

In one of the Vinita-vatthu cases, a bhikkhu steals ghee from a jar "little by little." This, according to the Commentary, means that first he decides to steal a spoonful of ghee from a jar. After swallowing the spoonful, he decides to steal one more. After that he decides to steal another, and so on until he has finished the jar. Because each spoonful was stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs several dukkaṭas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.

If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to build himself a hut and then steals a plank from here and a rafter from there, taking lumber over many days at different places from various owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total value of all the lumber stolen, inasmuch as he took all the pieces of wood as a consequence of one prior plan.

Derived offenses. In addition to the lesser offenses related to the value of the object, the Vibhaṅga also lists lesser offenses related to two factors of the full offense under this rule: effort and perception.

With regard to effort, the Vibhaṅga states that the derived offenses begin when one walks toward the object with the intent of stealing it, with each separate act — and in the case of walking toward the object, each step — incurring a dukkaṭa, up to a point just prior to the actual stealing where the offenses turn into thullaccayas. Where this point occurs depends on the act constituting the actual taking, as follows:

Moving the object from its place: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully moving it from its place: a thullaccaya.

"Cutting off" a fistful: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully cutting off a fistful: a thullaccaya.

Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: all steps up through touching the pool or pile: dukkaṭas. Making the pool or pile budge without fully getting five māsakas worth separated from the pool or pile and inside the vessel: a thullaccaya.

Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Lifting the object: a thullaccaya. Bringing it up to the level of the mouth of the container: another thullaccaya.

Drinking liquid from a container: all steps up through drinking one māsaka worth of liquid as part of one prior plan (§): dukkaṭas. Drinking between one and five māsakas' worth of liquid: a thullaccaya.

Moving the object from one part of one's body to another or dropping it: all steps up through touching the object with the intent to move it or drop it: dukkaṭas. Moving it but not to the point of putting it on another part of the body or dropping it: a thullaccaya.

Causing a boat to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: all steps up through loosening the moorings and/or touching it: dukkaṭas. Making the boat rock without causing it to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a thullaccaya.

Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: all steps up through breaking the embankment and letting up to one māsaka's worth of water flow out: dukkaṭas. Letting between one and five māsakas' worth of water flow out: a thullaccaya.

Causing an animal to move all its feet: all steps up through touching the animal: dukkaṭas. Getting it to move any of its feet prior to its moving its last foot: a thullaccaya for each step.

Cutting down: all steps prior to the next to the last chop needed to cut the plant through: dukkaṭas. The next to the last chop: a thullaccaya.

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of objects handed to one for safe keeping: all steps up through telling the owner, "I didn't receive (§) it": dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner's mind as to whether he/she will get the object back: a thullaccaya. If the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of land: all steps us to laying claim to the land: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner's mind as to whether he/she will lose the land: a thullaccaya. Again, if the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.

Shifting a boundary marker: all steps up through removing the boundary marker from its original place: dukkaṭas. Any steps between that and putting the boundary marker in a new place: thullaccayas.

Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: all steps up through touching the object with the intent of taking it out of the customs area: dukkaṭas. Making the object move without fully moving it from the customs area: a thullaccaya.

The commentaries state that when a heavier penalty is incurred in offenses of this sort, only that penalty is counted, and the preceding lighter ones are nullified. They derive this principle from a passage in the Vibhaṅga to Sg 10-13 and, using the Great Standards, apply it to all the rules. Thus, for example, if a bhikkhu trying to steal a book simply touches it, he incurs a string of dukkaṭas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to move it completely from its place, the dukkaṭas are nullified and replaced with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the thullaccaya and replaces it with a pārājika.

There is some question, though, as to whether the compilers of the Canon intended the passage under Sg 10-13 to be taken as a general principle. They don't mention it under any of the other saṅghādisesa rules or in the otherwise parallel passage in the Vibhaṅga to Pc 68. Thus, the principle seems intended only for those four rules. To be on the strict side, it seems best to say that, unless otherwise noted, a bhikkhu who completes an act must make amends for all the offenses incurred in leading up to it. Under the pārājika rules this is a moot point, for once the pārājika is committed the offender is no longer a bhikkhu. But under the lesser rules this principle is still relevant.

As for the derived offenses related to the factor of perception, these deal with the situation in which an article does not qualify as not given under this rule — e.g., it has no owner, or the owner has given it up or thrown it away — and yet the bhikkhu perceives it as not given. If he takes it with intent to steal, he incurs a dukkaṭa for each of the three stages of effort. In the case of an object that can be stolen by moving it from its place, these would be: touching the object, making it budge, moving it from its place. A similar set of offenses would apply in the stages appropriate for taking any of the other types of objects listed above.

Accomplices. A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals an object, but also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the acts leading up to the theft are as follows:

If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to take an object that would be grounds for a pārājika, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the accomplice agrees to do so, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object as instructed — regardless of whether he gets away with it, and of whether he shares it with the instigator — the instigator incurs a pārājika. If the accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too incurs a pārājika. If the object would be grounds for a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa, the only penalties incurred prior to the actual theft would be dukkaṭas.

The Commentary insists that if the accomplice is sure to take the item, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika as soon as the accomplice agrees to take it. However, as the Vinaya-mukha notes, this contradicts the Canon, and there is no way to measure whether a proposed theft is a sure thing or not.

If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions — e.g., if the accomplice, instead of taking the object specified by the instigator, takes something else instead; or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning — the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before the theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the object anyway.

According to the Vibhaṅga, an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it is carried out but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.

The Commentary also adds that the factor of the thief's perception does not affect the penalties. In other words, if Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to steal object X, and B takes Y, thinking it to be X, A is absolved of any responsibility for the theft. Conversely, if B takes X, thinking it to be Y, A is guilty of the theft.

The Vibhaṅga also notes that if an instigator tells his accomplice to take an item when he (the instigator) makes a sign — such as winking (§) his eye, lifting his eyebrow, or lifting his head — he incurs a dukkaṭa in making this order, a thullaccaya if the accomplice agrees to do as told, and the full offense when the accomplice actually takes the item at the time of the sign. If the accomplice takes the item before or after the sign, though, the instigator incurs no offense. The Sub-commentary, noting that the signs mentioned in the Vibhaṅga are so fleeting that it would be impossible to take the item at the very moment of the sign, interprets this last statement as follows: If the accomplice starts trying to take the item right after the sign, then regardless of how much time that takes, it counts as "at the time of the sign." Only if he makes an appreciable delay before attempting the theft does it count as "after the sign."

We can extrapolate from this discussion and say that any physical gesture that, from the context of events, is intended and understood as an order to take an item, would count under the factor of effort here. This extrapolation will be useful when treating the unauthorized use of credit cards, below.

The Vibhaṅga states that if there is a chain of command involving two or more bhikkhus (not counting the instigator) — for example, Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft — then when D agrees to commit the theft, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once D takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chain of command — e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly — neither A nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself. Bhikkhu A would incur a dukkaṭa for telling B, whereas C would incur no penalty at all.

The Commentary notes that the instigator in any of these cases incurs the penalty only if he gives an explicit command to take the item (although this statement has to be qualified to include signs meant as commands, as mentioned above). If he simply tells his accomplice that such-and-such an item is located in such-and-such a place and would be easy to steal, he incurs no penalty even if the accomplice actually commits the theft. This point applies to many of the rules in which giving a command to do an action that would break the rule would also fulfil the factor of effort: A statement counts as a command only if it is a clear imperative to do the action. Under the few rules where this is not the case, we will note the exception.

None of the texts mention the scenario in which Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to take an item for him without letting B know that he is committing a theft — for instance, telling B that the item belongs to him (A), that it is ownerless, or letting B come to either conclusion on his own. Nevertheless, it would appear that if B then actually takes the item as told, all of the factors for an offense would be fulfilled for A: He gives the command to take (the imperative the Vibhaṅga uses in illustrating commands to "steal" — avahara — can also simply mean to "take"), he knows that the item belongs to someone else, he intends to have it taken, and it is taken as a result of his command. As for B, he would not be committing an offense, as his state of mind would not fulfil the factors of perception and intention for a theft.

Cases of this sort would not fall under Deceit, discussed below, because that category covers only cases where one deceives the owner of the item, or his agent, into giving the item, and thus technically the item counts as given. Here the item is not given, for the person deceived into taking it is not responsible for it at all.

As with the extrapolation from the discussion of signs, this application of the Great Standards will also be useful when we discuss unauthorized use of credit cards, below. It will also prove useful in our discussion of the following rule.

Shared responsibility. If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft but only one of them does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft. Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five māsakas but which when divided among them yield shares worth less than five māsakas each, all incur a pārājika. According to the Commentary, any bhikkhus who assist a bhikkhu in a fraudulent case also incur the same offense he does: a pārājika if he wins, a thullaccaya if he loses. This judgment, however, must be qualified by noting that the assistant incurs these penalties only if he perceives the case to be fraudulent.

Special cases. As mentioned above, the notion of stealing covers a wide range of actions. To delineate this range, the texts discuss a variety of actions that border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule, some of them not.

Belongings of the Saṅgha. According to the Commentary to NP 30, an item belongs to the Saṅgha when donors, intending for it to be Saṅgha property, offer it to one or more bhikkhus representing the Saṅgha, and those bhikkhus receive it, although not necessarily into their hands. Saṅgha property thus counts as "what is not given" as far as individual bhikkhus are concerned, for it has an owner — the Saṅgha of all times and places — and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.

Saṅgha property is divided into two sorts: light/inexpensive (lahu-bhaṇḍa) and heavy/expensive (garu-bhaṇḍa). Light property includes such things as robes, bowls, medicine, and food; heavy property, such things as monastery land, buildings, and furnishings (see BMC2, Chapter 7). The Buddha gave permission for individual Communities to appoint officials to be responsible for the proper use of Saṅgha property. The officials responsible for light property are to distribute it among the members of the Community, following set procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair (see BMC2, Chapter 18). Once an individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his own and use it as he sees fit.

In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are responsible for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the Community, but the individual bhikkhus allowed to use it may not regard it as their own personal property. This is an important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or exchanged — with the approval of the Community — for other heavy property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to anyone — ordained or not — perceiving it as his to give, incurs a thullaccaya no matter what the value of the object (Cv.VI.15.2 — see BMC2, Chapter 7). Of course, if he knows that it is not his to give or take, then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the penalty for stealing.

The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Saṅgha. In the origin story to Pr 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Saṅgha's heavy property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.

However, the Vinita-vatthu includes a case where bhikkhus visiting a monastery arrange for a lay person to pick and give them some of the fruit growing in the monastery. The Buddha, in judging the case, states that they committed no offense as they were taking the fruit just for their own consumption. This implies that if they were to take the fruit for other purposes — to have it sold, for instance — they would be guilty of an offense. The Commentary adds that visiting bhikkhus have this right only if the resident bhikkhus are not caring for the fruit trees, if the trees had not been donated to provide funds for a particular purpose in the monastery, or if the resident bhikkhus eat from the trees as if they alone were the owners and are not willing to share. In other words, the visiting bhikkhus, as a matter of courtesy, should ask the residents first. If the residents share, one may take what they offer. If they don't, and the trees are not dedicated to another purpose, one may take just enough for one's own consumption. The Commentary also adds that if the monastery is vacant, one may go ahead and take the fruit, for it is meant for all bhikkhus who come.

The Vinita-vatthu also notes that a bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Saṅgha donated for use in a particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkaṭa. If he takes it on loan, he commits no offense.

Deceit. If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive another person into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not as a case of stealing — because, after all, the item is given to him — but rather as a case of lying. If the lie involves making false claims to superior meditative attainments, it is treated under Pr 4. If not, it is treated under Pc 1. The Vinita-vatthu gives seven examples: five cases where, during a distribution of requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu asks for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu; and two where a bhikkhunī approaches her teacher's lay supporter and asks for medicines, saying that they will be for her teacher, although she actually ends up using them herself. In all of these cases, the penalty is a pācittiya for lying under Pc 1.

The Commentary, in its discussion of the bhikkhus taking an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, insists that the penalty for lying applies only to cases where donors have already given the requisites to the Community. If, prior to their giving the requisites to the Community, a bhikkhu asks them directly for a portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, the Commentary says that he has committed a theft under this rule. This, however, contradicts the ruling in the two cases involving the bhikkhunī, who asks directly from the donor. Thus it would appear that in any case where a bhikkhu obtains an article from a donor through deceit, the penalty would be the pācittiya for lying.

The question arises, what about a bhikkhu who, given an item to take to someone else, originally plans to take it to the intended recipient but later changes his mind? It does not seem right to impose a heavier penalty on him than on a person who uses deceit to get the item to begin with, so it seems best to impose on him the dukkaṭa for a broken promise (Mv.III.14.1-14 — see the discussion under Pc 1). For the principles surrounding the courier's right to take an item on trust in the donor or the recipient, see the discussion of trust under the non-offense clauses.

Receiving stolen goods. Accepting a gift of goods or purchasing them very cheaply, knowing that they were stolen, would in Western criminal law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself. However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case. The closest they come is in the Vinita-vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it was not his to give, and there was no offense for the bhikkhus. From this it can be inferred that there is no offense for receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so would not be exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in the course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe.

Compensation owed. The Commentary introduces the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another person's property. It defines this concept by saying that the bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if the owner gives up his/her efforts to receive compensation, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika. The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.

To cite a few examples: A bhikkhu breaks another person's jar of oil or places excrement in the oil to spoil it. A bhikkhu charged with guarding the Community storeroom lets a group of other bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch belongings they have left there; they forget to close the door and, before he remembers to check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of thieves steal a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it and run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. A bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, sets it free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he has done. In each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu in question owes compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the case of the mangoes, he must compensate not only the owners but also the thieves if it turns out that they had planned to come back and fetch the fruit.) If he abandons his responsibility to the owner(s), he incurs a pārājika.

In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following the civil law of its day, for the Canon contains no reference at all to the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, and some of its judgments contradict the Commentary's. As we noted above, the Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the Vinita-vatthu discusses cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, or where he feels compassion for an animal caught in a trap and so sets it free, it says that there is no offense. Thus it seems strange for the Commentary to assign a pārājika to an action that, according to the Canon, carries a dukkaṭa or no penalty at all. Of course, it would be a generous policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal or liberty to do so. Because the Canon does not allow a bhikkhu to ask his supporters for donations to pay to another lay person — except for his parents (Mv.VIII.22; see BMC2, Chapter 10) — there is no way a bhikkhu could raise the needed funds. The Canon places only one responsibility on a bhikkhu who causes material loss to a lay person: The Community, if it sees fit, can force him to apologize to the owner (Cv.I.20; see BMC2, Chapter 20). Beyond that, the Canon does not require that he make material compensation of any kind. Thus, as the Commentary's concept of bhaṇḍadeyya is clearly foreign to the Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it.

Enforcement of rules. There is one important area in which even the Commentary does not require compensation, and that is when a bhikkhu sees another bhikkhu using an inappropriate object and arranges to have it destroyed. Here the Commentary draws its argument from the origin story to this rule, in which the Buddha orders the bhikkhus to destroy an inappropriately made hut — a "potter's hut," which was made from earth and then fired like a pot. From this example, the Commentary draws the following judgment: If a bhikkhu starts to build an inappropriate hut in a certain territory, the "owners" of the territory (i.e., the resident senior bhikkhus) should tell him to stop. If he does not heed their decision and actually builds the hut there, then when they are able to assemble a sufficient number of righteous bhikkhus, the resident senior bhikkhus can send him an order to remove it. If, after the order has been sent three times, the hut is still not removed, the bhikkhus are to dismantle it in such a way that the materials can be reused. The original builder is then to be told to remove the materials. If he doesn't, then the resident bhikkhus are not responsible for any loss or damage they may undergo.

The Commentary then derives a further principle from this example to say that if Bhikkhu X, who is knowledgeable in the Vinaya, sees Bhikkhu Y using inappropriate requisites of any sort, he is entitled to get them destroyed or reduced to an appropriate form. He is also not obligated to compensate Y for any loss or inconvenience incurred.

Court actions. As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the final court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a pārājika. The Commentary to the Bhikkhunī's Sg 1, however, states that even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone — defamed, physically injured, robbed, etc. — and then tries to take a just court action against the guilty party, he incurs a pārājika if he wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya-mukha points out, its assertion cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or material terms.

There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in accordance with the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the outcome for the others involved. However, Pc 9 would require that he first be authorized to do so by the Community if his testimony involves reporting the wrongdoing of others. See that rule for further details.

Modern cases. The modern world contains many forms of ownership and monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, and so contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then either. Here are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of ways in which the standards of this rule might be applied to modern situations.

Infringement of copyright. The international standards for copyright advocated by UNESCO state that infringement of copyright is tantamount to theft. However, in practice, an accusation of copyright infringement is judged not as a case of theft but as one of "fair use," the issue being the extent to which a person in possession of an item may fairly copy that item for his/her own use or to give or sell to another person without compensating the copyright owner. Thus even a case of "unfair use" would not fulfill the factors of effort and object under this rule, in that — in creating a copy — one is not taking possession of an item that does not belong to one, and one is not depriving the owners of something already theirs. At most, the copyright owners might claim that they are being deprived of compensation owed to them, but as we have argued above, the principle of compensation owed does not rightly belong under this rule. In the terminology of the Canon, a case of unfair use would fall under either of two categories — acting for the non-gain of the copyright owners or wrong livelihood — categories that entail a dukkaṭa under the general rule against misbehavior (Cv.V.36). They would also make one eligible for a disciplinary transaction, such as reconciliation or banishment (see BMC2, Chapter 20), which the Community could impose if it saw the infringement as serious enough to merit such a punishment.

Copying computer software. The agreement made when installing software on a computer, by which one agrees not to give the software to anyone else, comes under contract law. As such, a breach of that contract would be treated under the category of "deceit," described above, which means that a bhikkhu who gives software to a friend in defiance of this contract would incur the penalty for a broken promise. As for the friend — assuming that he is a bhikkhu — the act of receiving the software and putting it on his computer would be treated under the precedent, mentioned above, of the bhikkhus receiving fruit from an orchard groundkeeper not authorized to give it away: He would incur no offense. However, as he must agree to the contract before installing the software on his computer, he would incur a penalty for a broken promise if he then gave the software to someone else in defiance of the contract.

Credit cards. The theft of a credit card would of course be an offense. Because the owner of the card, in most cases, would not be required to pay for the stolen card, the seriousness of a theft of this sort would be determined by how the thief used the card. NP 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use it for him. In any event, the use of the card would be equivalent to using a stolen key to open a safe. If the thief hands the credit card to a store clerk to make a purchase, that would count as a gesture telling the clerk to transfer funds from the account of the credit card company. Because such operations are automated, the clerk's attempt to have the funds transferred would count not as an act of deceit but an act of taking. If the credit card company's machines authorize the transaction, then the theft occurs as soon as funds are transferred from one account to another. The seriousness of the theft would be calculated in line with the principle of the "prior plan" mentioned above.

In a situation where the funds, if transferred, would entail a pārājika, then if the machines do not authorize the transaction, the bhikkhu trying to use the card would incur a thullaccaya for getting the clerk to attempt the transfer. If the clerk, doubting the bhikkhu's right to use the card, refuses to attempt the transfer, the bhikkhu would incur a dukkaṭa in making the gesture of command.

Similar considerations would apply to the unauthorized use of debit cards, ATM cards, phone cards, personal identification numbers, or any other means by which funds would be transferred from the owner's account by automated means.

A forged check drawn on a bank where the scanning and approval of checks is fully automated would fall under this category. If drawn on a bank where an employee would be responsible for approving the check, the entire case would come under false dealing, discussed above.

Unauthorized telephone or Internet use would count as theft only if the charges were automatically transferred from the owner's account. If the owner is simply billed for the charges, he/she could refuse to pay, and so no theft would have occurred. This would count, not as a theft, but as promise made in bad faith, which would incur a pācittiya. If, however, the case seemed serious enough, and the pācittiya too light a punishment, the Community could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender.

Impounded items — such as a repaired automobile kept in a mechanic's shop — would apparently be treated in a similar way to smuggled goods.

Non-offenses. In addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under the preceding rule, the non-offense clauses here list six exemptions to this rule. Two relate to the status of the object, two to the factor of perception, and two to the factor of intention.

Object. There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object belonging (1) to a peta (§) or (2) to an animal (§). Thus there is no offense in taking the remains of a lion's kill, regardless of how possessive the lion may feel, although the Commentary wisely advises waiting until the lion has eaten enough of its kill no longer to be hungry, for otherwise the bhikkhu may become lion's kill himself.

The Commentary classes devas under petas here and states that a bhikkhu may take a deva's belongings with no penalty. It illustrates this point with two examples. In the first, a bhikkhu takes a piece of cloth left hanging on a tree as an offering to a deva. In the second, a bhikkhu with clairvoyant powers gains a vision of Sakka, the king of the devas, who is wearing an expensive cloth. The bhikkhu takes the cloth with the intention of making a robe for himself, even though Sakka keeps screaming, "Don't take it! Don't take it!" This latter example may have been included in the Commentary simply for its shock value in order to wake up sleepy students in the back of the room. Although the bhikkhu in question would not incur an offense, there's no denying he's a fool.

The term peta also includes human corpses. In the early days of the religion, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take cloth from undecomposed bodies, and here is why:

"Now at that time a certain bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took hold of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed. But the spirit of the dead one was (still) dwelling in that body. Then it said to the bhikkhu, 'Venerable sir, don't take hold of my cloak.' The bhikkhu, disregarding it, went off (with the cloak). Then the body, rising up, followed right behind the bhikkhu. Then the bhikkhu, entering his dwelling, closed the door. Then the body fell down right there."

The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for ourselves both the bhikkhu's state of mind while being chased by the body and his friends' reaction to the event. As is usual with the stories in the Vibhaṅga, the more outrageous the event, the more matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the understatement.

At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a dukkaṭa for taking cloth from an undecomposed body — which, according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm.

Perception. There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object perceiving it (1) to be his own or (2) to have been thrown away (§). The Commentary states that if the bhikkhu finds out that the object does indeed have an owner, he owes the owner compensation and would be guilty of an offense when the owner abandons his efforts to gain that compensation. As we have already noted, the concept of compensation owed has no basis in the Canon, but if the object still lies in the bhikkhu's possession and he decides not to return it, that decision would count as a thieving intention. The theft of the object could then be treated under the category of a borrowed object, which in practice has the same effect as the Commentary's notion of compensation owed: The theft would be accomplished when the owner abandons his/her efforts to regain possession. However, if the object no longer exists (it was consumed by the bhikkhu or destroyed) or is no longer in the bhikkhu's possession (he lost it or gave it away), the resolution of the issue is purely a individual matter between the bhikkhu and the owner, although as we noted above, the Community, if it sees fit, could force the bhikkhu to apologize to the owner.

Intention. There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object (1) on trust or (2) temporarily.

To rightly take an object on trust, Mv.VIII.19.1 states that five conditions must be met:

    a. The owner is an acquaintance.
    b. He/she is an intimate.
    c. He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means that he/she has said, "You may take any of my property you want.")
    d. He/she is still alive.
    e. One knows that he/she will be pleased at one's taking it.

The Commentary to this rule states that in practice only three of these conditions need to be met: the fourth, the fifth, and any one of the first three. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, there are good practical reasons for adopting the Commentary's interpretation here. There is also the formal reason that otherwise the first two conditions would be redundant.

Mv.VIII.31.2-3 discusses how an item can be rightly taken on trust if a bhikkhu, as courier, is conveying it from a donor to an intended recipient. The deciding factor is what the donor says while handing over the item, which apparently determines who exercises rights of ownership over the item while it is in transit. If the donor says, "Give this to so-and-so" (which means that ownership has not yet been transferred to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the donor but not in the recipient. If he/she says, "I give this to so-and-so" (which transfers ownership to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the recipient but not in the donor. If, before the courier can convey the item to the intended the recipient, he learns that the owner — as determined by the donor's statement — happens to die, he may determine the item as an inheritance from the owner.

In both cases where the item may be legitimately taken on trust, none of the texts discuss whether the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 also have to be met or whether the allowances here are a special exemption to those factors granted specifically to couriers. However, because the allowances are so particular about who maintains ownership over the article while it is in transit, it would seem that the owner would have the right to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the courier's taking the item on trust. This further suggests that the courier would have to take the owner's perceived wishes into account, which implies that the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 still hold here.

The Vinita-vatthu treats the case of a bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; the Buddha termed this a "misconception as to trust" and did not impose a penalty. The Commentary to this rule adds that if the original owner informs one that he is displeased because he sincerely wanted to keep the item for another use, one should return it to him; but, in line with the Vinita-vatthu, it does not indicate a penalty for not returning it. If the owner is displeased with one for other reasons, the Commentary says, there is no need to return the item.

As for taking an item temporarily, the Commentary says this means taking it with the intention that (a) "I'll return it" or (b) "I'll make compensation." There is support in the Vibhaṅga for including (a) here, but none for (b). If the Commentary included (b) to cover cases where a bhikkhu borrows an object but then happens to lose or destroy it, there is no need to include it, for as we have already explained, a bhikkhu is under no compulsion to compensate people for items lost or destroyed. If the Commentary meant it to cover cases where a bhikkhu takes ownership of an object belonging to a person with whom he has not established trust and with whom he plans to discuss compensation later, it doesn't really fit under this exemption, for one is taking permanent possession of the item. Given the strict conditions that the Canon places on the exemption for taking an item on trust, it seems unlikely that its compilers would have countenanced an exemption for a bhikkhu to go around imposing unilateral trades, taking possession of items on the unfounded assumption that the owners would gladly accept compensation at a later time. If there is any place for this sort of exemption in the Vibhaṅga's framework, it would be as a variant on taking on trust. Thus it would have to meet the following factors: The owner is an acquaintance or an intimate or has spoken of the matter; he/she is still alive; and one knows that he/she would be pleased if one takes the item and gives compensation later.

In addition to the exemptions listed under the non-offense clauses, the Vinita-vatthu contains ten other types of cases that involve no offense under this rule. Some of these have already been mentioned in the above discussions, but it is convenient to have them gathered in one place.

— A bhikkhu, seeing an expensive garment, feels a desire to steal it but does not act on the desire. The commentaries take this as a general principle for all rules, that the mere arising of a mind state does not constitute an offense.

— A bhikkhu, seeing a cloak blown up by a whirlwind, catches it to return it to the owners.

— A bhikkhu takes an item on trust but later discovers that the trust is misconceived.

— A bhikkhu goes through a customs house, not knowing that a dutiable item is among his belongings.

— Visiting bhikkhus, for the sake of food, take fruit from a tree belonging to the Saṅgha.

— Bhikkhus receive fruit from the guardian of an orchard, even though the guardian is not entitled to give the fruit away.

— A bhikkhu, seeing an item left lying about, puts it away so that it won't get lost. The owner comes looking for the item and asks, "Who stole it?" The bhikkhu, perhaps ironically, responds, "I stole it." The owner then charges him with a theft. The case goes to the Buddha, who says that the bhikkhu committed no offense, in that his answer was just a manner of speaking and not an actual acknowledgement of a theft.

— A bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a hunter's snare.

— Ven. Ajjuka points out a bequest to an heir in line with the original owner's wishes.

— Ven. Pilindavaccha uses his psychic powers to retrieve a pair of kidnapped children. The Buddha states that this entails no penalty because such a thing lies in the province of those with psychic power. The Vinaya-mukha, in discussing this case, takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The Buddha's statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of this sort. If a bhikkhu without psychic powers happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees fit, and let them handle the situation themselves. However, for safety's sake, a bhikkhu living in a wilderness frequented by thieves would be wise not to be perceived as siding either with the thieves or the authorities.

Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a pārājika offense.

Not to speak about Bhikkhus who sell Dhamma or take it form some where in ownership for the sake of being sold.

[turtle]

Great topic!

Too bad Johann has left.

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/.../

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As for Laws in some European countries, such a point is even for a law side not legal, thinking on consumer protection and capital laws, even if popular in internet, such has no foothold anywhere.
I don't need to speak about rejecting responsibility from a Dhammic side and its a sign for people of integrity that you take up responsibility for their work, full and even more as worldly laws would demand.
/.../

I'm coming from the other side - as the dismayed target/user/recipient of this Caveat emptor! kind of spirituality/religion.

There are all these people who claim to be speaking The Truth, who claim to be speaking on behalf of God or the Buddha. And they tell us we must believe them, or we will burn in hell for all eternity, or otherwise face all kinds of horrible things. But at the same time, these people take no responsibility for us. They want to control us, but they refuse to take any responsibility for us.

Here we are, the spiritually lowly, we have no choice but to rely on those who are to be deemed spiritually advanced. Due to our lowliness, we cannot recognize who is in fact spiritually advanced or not, so we are left to the mercy of those who claim to be spiritually advanced, who claim to be speaking on behalf of God or the Buddha. And then those who claim to be spiritually advanced take no responsiblity whatsoever for us.

As if such a person were to say - "I am spiritually advanced. You should believe every word I say. You should worship me. But if you ever end up in any trouble, do not hope for any help from me. Of course, if you do not believe me, you will burn in hell for all eternity / never get to nirvana."

[Sophorn]

 

Don't be sad. Be happy that he continued to walk the next step.

Keep up your good spirit, dear Turtle.

 

[Johann]

More than happy to read that Ven. Sujaro had started to make and add own translations to suttacentral.net, I am really    that he did what should be the purpose of this topic: prevent of doing such! so neither direct talk, nor putting some preassure through publicity had helped.

This translation of the Theragāthā was made by bhikkhu sujato with jessica walton. It is based on the Mahāsaṅgīti edition of the Pali text.

The translation relies heavily on the translation and notes by k.r. norman for the Pali Text Society, published as Elders’s Verses I, first published 1965. For a few verses we have also consulted translations by Bhikkhu Thanissaro and Bhikkhu Bodhi. In all cases, however, the final translation was made directly from the Pali text.

This translation is published in September 2014. It is released by means of Creative Commons Zero (CC0 1.0 Universal) Public Domain Dedication. The translators waive all rights to the work worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law. You are encouraged to do anything you like with this text. You can copy, modify, translate, distribute, print, and perform the work, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.

If you notice any mistakes, we would appreciate if you could let us know. We would also like to know if you do anything interesting with the text, so we can support your activities. However, you are under no obligations to do so.

Attma guesses there is no way to make one understand, that one can not rightly sell something what is originated to be not sold or exchanged at all.[/quote]
Attma also wonders how one could build on a lisence of somenbody else without addopting it, which is the case in regard of the pali resourses as well as the works which have been used to make it real.

Attma would be happy to share it further, but as a counciously sangha-property-make-to-a-commercial-product thing, it is actually untouchable.

Still some hope remains.

[Johann]

The next big 'Stealing and "selling" the Dhamma' for a livelihood-Project:

I'd like to take the chance to announce a project that I have been working towards for the past several months. Many people have heard about this already, so it is no great secret, but I haven't taken the chance to formally announce it in public.

I am taking an 18 month sabbatical, during which time I plan to translate the 4 nikāyas from Pali into English; or at least, as much of them as I can.

My aim in doing this is to create an entirely new set of translations, which will differ from previous translations in several ways:

    Plain English: I aim to use the simplest, most direct language possible, with a special consideration for people who have English as a second language.
    Natively Digital: The translation is intended from the outset to be a digital text, and will be matched sentence by sentence with the underlying Pali.
    No Copyright: In accordance with 2500 years of Buddhist tradition [??? Which, Australian?, Sri Lankan-German?, US? Buddhist and the Army? Jewish?, Robin Hoods? ], the translation will be entirely free of copyright restrictions. It will be dedicated to the Public Domain via Creative Commons Zero. [Free to sell - So the "Buddhist Tradition", Mr. Sujato in camouflage of it, makes the heritage a market-product]
    Consistent: It will use the same phrasing and terminology across the 4 nikāyas, so you can easily search over the entire corpus.

Straight forward, with all consequences in my position: this (and mind equals) is (are) no Monk (s) any more, but seller (thief) of the Sangha heritage.

Today, the Buddha's words, which are so beautiful and so profound, are not freely available in a complete, accurate, readable form. It think this is a dreadful thing, and I want to change it.

The reason for this is, because People used to put it on the Market and Mr. Sujato planes to make it even more unavailable as a part of the practice from the beginning (the gain) till its end.

[Johann]

Ther have been deleted some posts, I do not always keep copies, well meant hints, so that was what one may have tried to hinder... and what was foreseeable for everybody with less dust in the eyes... and it will go further, its not the end...

SuttaCentral now has donations

SuttaCentral is now accepting donations.

Donate to SuttaCentral

In the past we did not set up a donations facility, as we had enough funds for our limited needs. Now, however, we are employing a full time developer, in addition to several other ongoing costs, such as typing the texts in several languages. So we have set this up to guarantee our future stability.

The work behind the scenes has been mainly done by Deepika, who has set up the SuttaCentral Development Trust. Details are on our Donations page.

The facility has been set up using the secure modern payment system, Stripe.

If you think SuttaCentral is amazing, now you can help us make it even better.

[Johann]

What to say or think...

Attma likes the practical explaining at the mainpage (see pictures attached) most... 
next to this: "For donors of over $100, or over $10/month, we would like to offer as a gift a printed copy of the Theragāthā, the “Verses of the Senior Monks”. This fascinating but little-known text from the Pali Canon has been freshly translated by Bhante Sujato for SuttaCentral." so that one can be sure that it stays Dana and not a deal...

http://suttacentral.net/
https://suttacentral.net/donations

[Johann]

public property? Dust in the eyes of Attma/Samana?

Bhikkhu Boddhis (he was personal warned, at the moment SC came to awarness) "In buddhas word" now free available public, from a Russian dhamma-pirate "it should be free!", some years ago shared on DW...

http://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/in-the-buddha-s-words/29/1

desire is much faster as gifts could ever be. That is why patient is the training.

How could a trader feel save, if precepts are not higher as Dhamma and the ongoing wheel?

The (w)link of an DW moderator , Attma followed, to this "ill willed" post... of "hey take care, that has been so much trust of many!"

[Johann]

Copy this    Copyright is a big deal. There’s hardly a single computer user who hasn’t faced the possibility of using or creating content that infringes copyright. And it is a huge deal in the area of Buddhist texts, where many texts are protected under some form of copyright law. I’m going to make a somewhat complex argument here, so let me state my conclusions up front.
I think copyright is a bad idea. I think we would be better off without it. But regardless of whether it has certain applications in some areas, it contradicts fundamental Buddhist principles and should never be applied to Buddhist scriptures.
 Why is copyright a bad idea? The basic premise of copyright is this: that we can ensure creative incomes by legal means. The purpose of copyright is to provide a legal avenue to ensure the rights of original creators are respected. That is to say, a copyright notice is nothing if it is not an implicit legal threat. It says, if you don’t comply, you are a criminal and we will take you to court. The problem is not just that these threats don’t work, it is that they prevent us from even considering more humane and socially-based measures.
When copyright laws evolved over the past few centuries, we lived in a completely different world. Copying took effort, and it could be reasonably contained. But for the past 20 years or so, the combined effort of human ingenuity and industrial output has created billions of machines that can copy incredibly fast, and has put those machines in the hands of most of the people on this planet.
Then you say to everyone, “Please don’t use these machines for copying!” Have you heard what happened in the Garden of Eden? Let me make a huge leap and guess: people copy stuff anyway.
Have a look at how many copyright takedown notices Google gets:

Yep, that’s over a million requests every day. For one company. And see how it’s soared over the past few years, at the same time as the protectors of copyright have pushed hard for creating ever more draconian laws.
There aren’t that many bad people in the world. If the law says that millions of people are criminals, it’s the law that is wrong, not the people. Any law that is broken this often is ill-conceived.
It seems to me that successful laws are of two kinds. You either have laws that govern things that are very exceptional, only a few people do them, and they fall well outside what are considered acceptable; such as murder, theft, and the like. In such cases, you ban the thing and impose substantial penalties. But other kinds of laws govern things that most people do, or might do. It’s not so much a matter of prohibiting things because they are wrong, but managing them in the interests of the public good. I’m thinking of things like speeding tickets, or building regulations, or non-smoking zones. In such cases we try to nudge people towards a better behavior. You tweak them, making them more stringent, together with an education component, and gradually build a social expectation of acceptable behavior.
The problem with copyright law is that it tries to apply the absolutism which is appropriate for the first kind of law to something that should be managed by the second kind of law. You can’t just make people stop copying things they like. It’s never going to happen. Maybe you could make them modify their behavior, but until you give them a way of doing that it is a losing battle.
Copyright law, it is often believed, may be justified by reference to the economic reality. But if that’s the case, why do the proponents of copyright resort to falsified data to justify their positions? There are, on the other hand, multiple accounts by authors and formal studies that show that publishing books freely on the internet dramatically increases usage and has little effect on book sales .
The intended purpose of copyright is not to protect corporations, but to protect the work of creators. But here’s the thing. Before I was a monk, I was an original creator. I was a songwriter; and I lived among creative artists. For 6 or 7 years pretty much all my friends were writers, poets, actors, musicians, painters, or dancers. And I can’t recall a single time when copyright law was actually relevant to anyone. True, I made a small amount from song royalties, but it never affected our lives all that much.
And anyway, even if you, as a struggling artist, became aware of a copyright violation, what could you do about it? Take a publisher or record company to court? Good luck with that. What you’d do, if anything, is contact the alleged violator, and if they didn’t do as you asked, you’d grumble about it. You don’t need a legal system for that.
Copyright becomes relevant when you step up into the realm of corporate sponsored art. You sign a contract, giving the copyright ownership to a company. For us it was a record company, otherwise it might be a book publisher, a movie studio or whatever. Then they own the copyright, and you get a small percentage (in our case, about 10%—so much for protecting the rights of creative artists.) If there is a copyright violation, the company goes to court, because they can afford to.
Now, in some cases this can be justified. For example, it’s really expensive to make a movie. You need companies to provide the financing and bear the risk. But this is a purely contingent fact, and it changes depending on technology. In the past, for example, a publishing company was needed to produce books. Gradually, technology has eaten away at the specialist services that publishers can offer. Typesetting, proofreading, design, marketing, printing, distribution: all these can now be done easily by individual authors, who can then keep full copyright control over their works. On Amazon, nearly 50% of creator revenue for genre titles is now from self-published books . So the fact that producing some kinds of creative work requires large companies and legal protection does not mean that such protection is necessary everywhere.
The notion that copyright exists to protect creators withers when you consider the devastating impact that the radical expansion of copyright has had on works whose creators have died. Here’s some background on this, from Professor James Boyle of Duke Law School :
 

Congress eliminated the benign practice of the renewal requirement (which had guaranteed that 85% of works and 93% of books entered the public domain after 28 years because the authors and publishers simply didn’t want or need a second copyright term.) And copyright, which had been an opt-in system (you had to comply with some very minor formalities to get a copyright) became an opt out system (you got a copyright automatically when you “fixed” the work in material form, whether you wanted it or not.) Suddenly the entire world of informal and non commercial culture — from home movies that provide a wonderful lens into the private life of an era, to essays, posters, locally produced teaching materials — was swept into copyright. And kept there for the life of the author plus 70 years. The effects were culturally catastrophic. Copyright went from covering very little culture, and only covering it for a 28 year period during which it was commercially available, to covering all of culture, regardless of whether it was available — often for over a century. Unlike Fahrenheit 451, the vast majority of the culture swept into this 20th century black hole was not commercially available and, in most cases, the authors are unknown. The works are locked up — with no benefit to anyone — and no one has the key that would unlock them. We have cut ourselves off from our own culture, left it to molder — and in the case of nitrate film, literally disintegrate — with no benefit to anyone. The works may not be physically destroyed — although many of them are; disappearing, disintegrating, or simply getting lost in the vastly long period of copyright to which we have relegated them. But for the vast majority of works and the vast majority of citizens who do not have access to one of our great libraries, they are gone as thoroughly as if we had piled up the culture of the 20th century and simply set fire to it; and all this right at the moment when we could have used the Internet vastly to expand the scope of cultural access.
 

That this extension of copyright is useless and harmful is not just the opinion of a few radicals. In 2002 a team of 19 economists, including 4 Nobel laureates, submitted an analysis to the US Congress on the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, where they concluded that , “Taken as a whole, the authors believe that it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits from copyright extension under the CTEA outweigh the additional costs.” And yet, it is still with us.
Here’s a stunning graphic that shows just how deep a hole in our culture copyright law has dug. It’s from a paper titled “How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared ”, by Paul J. Heald of the University of Illinois College of Law. This graphic shows how books published before the magic public-domain date of 1923 are far more available than those published after. Essentially, publishers make texts available for a decade or two, and then they languish unread until they enter public domain.

The proof is in the pudding. Empirical studies show that creative workers earn an average of around half the median wage, and what income there is is extremely unequal and uncertain. In a survey of 25,000 authors in the UK and Germany, authors Martin Kretschmer and Philip Hardwick of the Bournemouth University Business School wrote that, if the aim of copyright law is to provide reasonable renumeration for writers, “This study shows quite conclusively that current copyright law has empirically failed to meet these aims. ” They added, “After this study, copyright policy cannot remain the same.” And yet not only has there been no reform, things continue to get worse, as in the top secret deals being forged in the Trans-Pacific Partnership .
If the law doesn’t really protect creative artists, then who does it protect? Copyright law is an instrument of capitalism, and like all instruments of capitalism, it aims to make the rich richer. Who is making all the fuss about copyright? Farmers in Kenya? Street cleaners in Manila? Bus drivers in Brazil? No, it’s the owners of massive, wealthy corporations .
The practical result of copyright, I allege, is to take money out of the hands of creative artists and their fans, and concentrate it in the hands of the rich, who control the means of production. Think about it: why was copyright law created in the past 300 years or so? Isn’t that the time when the printing press became used? A printing press allows mass copying of writing, but it does so at considerable expense, in terms of the physical machinery and space, but also in terms of time and experience, and carefully learned craftsmanship. When the laws were created, this served a purpose, as the capital—printing presses, distribution networks, and the like—was necessary to propagate work. So a class of company, known as “publishers”, was created to deal with these things and enable the printing and distribution of books. But now, the measurable effect of copyright law is to prevent people from accessing content. And the reason for this is straightforward: the whole idea is based on a state of technology that simply doesn’t exist any more.
Profit arises from the demand for a good whose supply is limited. In the 20th century, the supply of intellectual content was limited, and so it was a valuable commodity. Now it’s not, despite the efforts of content providers to keep it so. Information is the cheapest thing in the world; much cheaper than water. The economic thinking that underlies copyright law is deeply disconnected from the real world.
I have looked for demographic data on the economic effects of copyright law and haven’t been able to find anything, so allow me to make an unsubstantiated hypothesis. If anyone knows of some information, please let me know. But here is my thesis: the flow of money from copyright is, on the whole, from the poor to the rich; from the colored to the white; from the female to the male; from the underdeveloped countries to the developed; and from the young to the old. Prove me wrong!
If we are to retain any form of copyright law, we should develop it like the second kind of law I mentioned above, in a gradual and pragmatic way, together with an education process.
One model would be to make copyright law more like patent law. It would be opt-in, so a creator would have to make an application for copyright, which spelled out the reasons for applying copyright in this instance. If the application was successful, a percentage of earnings, say 10%, would go to the regulatory body, thus providing funding for it. This would ensure that copyright is only applied for substantive works, and works where the creator genuinely expects that they will lose more than 10% of their earnings by copying. The copyright would apply for a reasonable period, say 20 years, as is the case with patents.
As long as humans have existed, they have created. The first signs of human creative activity are nearly 100,000 years old. Creativity is an expression of the human spirit: it doesn’t belong to capitalism. No matter what you do, people will create. People all over the world are creating, writing, painting, playing music, and they couldn’t care less about copyright. Copyright law is not about fostering creativity. It is about keeping alive an economic order based on 20th century technology, which ensures that a small circle of the rich get the bulk of the economic gain from creative activity.
 What about Buddhism? You’d think that it wouldn’t need stating, but evidently it does: Buddhism is about letting go, copyright is about holding on.
Even if we can accept a case for certain forms of copyright in certain spheres of life, how should that apply to Buddhism? After all, Buddhism not merely survived, but flourished for thousands of years before copyright came on the picture. Perhaps some historical perspective is in order.
The first question, which can be dealt with swiftly, is whether copying is stealing under the Buddhist precepts. The answer is no. Stealing in Buddhism requires that the owner be deprived of something. Copying is not taking. You could argue that the creator is indirectly deprived of income, but that is irrelevant. There are plenty of ways to indirectly deprive someone of income; I could set up a rival business, for example. I might even do that out of malice, to deliberately harm you. That may not be a nice thing to do, it might even be illegal, but it has nothing to do with stealing. Of course, breaking copyright is against the law, which is a separate matter; but it is not breaking precepts.
Incidentally, many monastics, like most people in developing countries, use pirated software all the time. If copying was stealing, they’d risk falling into an expulsion offence. However, even though there is no expulsion offence for using the software, it is still often illegal. This is one of the many reasons why monastics should use Free and Open Source Software (FOSS), such as Linux. This also highlights one of the often-overlooked details of copyright history. Software is an unusual industry in that extensive copying has existed as long as the industry has. People have been using millions of pirated copies of Windows and other software as long as they have been around. Yet software companies are thriving, and making record profits.
For the Buddhist tradition, as indeed for most ancient traditions, there is no notion of intellectual property. People borrowed and copied all the time. Buddhist texts are full of cases where monks or nuns are quoting verbatim passages from the Buddha or others, and there is never an issue of ownership. That’s because the Dhamma is not about ownership. It’s about helping people let go of suffering.
The Dhamma was felt to be, if anyone’s, the Buddha’s. The Buddha encouraged his students to teach the Dhamma in their own language; so that, from the earliest days, the Dhamma existed in multiple translated forms, all of which were considered to be the words of the Buddha. When the texts were later translated into Chinese and Tibetan, they continued this tradition, regarding these texts as “the word of the Buddha” in exactly the same sense as the “original” scriptures (which were themselves translations from one Indic dialect to another).
However, in modern times agreements such as the Berne convention ruled that translations should be considered to be original creations. I think this is a mistake. I’ve done original writing, and I’ve done translations, and they are very different kinds of things. You can, for example, get a computer to do translation, albeit poorly, but no computer can write a meaningful original article.
Be that as it may, it is clearly contrary to the entire Buddhist tradition. And needless to say, no-one thought to consult Buddhists about this. It was a law made in Europe by some rich white men, who were not even thinking that their acts might affect an ancient spiritual tradition from the East. Yet this law has been adopted by many Buddhists who use it to control how translations are made. No longer are Buddhist scriptures regarded as the “word of the Buddha”, but as the property of individuals, or more likely, of corporations. This tendency is found mostly among western translators; Asian translators mostly stick closer to the original spirit, although they sometimes use restrictive licences of various forms.
Not only are translations regarded as owned by individuals, even the original texts are frequently subject to copyright claims. You’d think that a millenia old text would be pretty firmly in the Public Domain, but apparently many publishers of original texts don’t think so. Going beyond the extremely broad scope of copyright law, they publish licences with their texts, sometimes “releasing” them under various Creative Commons licences. But you can only licence something that you own, and you can’t just go around claiming to own something that you don’t. To make such a claim is, or it should be, illegal. (Since copyright law is written almost entirely to protect the interests of content providers, it is not clear to what extent such a claim is fact illegal. But the principle is clear enough.)
The basic justification for copyright is that if we don’t copyright things, creators won’t get compensation, and the work will not be done. This is a dubious argument in the creative industries generally, since not only, as we have seen, is there no real evidence that copyright ensures a decent living for artists, but because artists are not motivated primarily by money.
This is even more applicable to Buddhism. No-one translates Buddhist texts for money; which is a very good thing, because if you did, you’ll be pretty disappointed. We—the monastics, academics, institutions, or private individuals—who do the work of translation do it out of love. There are vast quantities of translations that have been done and simply put out there, with no attempt at getting recompense. And even in the minority of cases where works are published commercially, the translators, and the many assistants who made these works possible, typically don’t get any income from them. Given this, it seems to me that the best way to produce high quality translations is to make our work freely available, so it can be copied, adapted, and improved. If funding is needed, for example, if someone wants to take time off work to complete a translation, we should rely on the Buddhist culture of dana, which has supported the maintaining and spreading of the texts for so long.
When I suggest that we shouldn’t use copyright on our texts, people say, but how do you stop them being misused? I just don’t get what the problem is. Does anyone really think that there are hordes of malicious people waiting out there to do awful things with Buddhist texts?
If, by some remote chance, someone does do something malicious with my work, such as, say, passing it off as their own, I’ll contact them and ask them to stop. If they don’t, I’ll rely on the power of peer pressure. I’ll write about it, and let people know that there’s a scam afoot. The perps will fade away soon enough. I’d never take someone to court for anything like that, so why issue an empty threat?
To me, it seems that this concern betrays a deeper misunderstanding of what copyright law is all about.
Copyright is not something that you can claim or not claim. It exists by law because you made a creative work. By operating under copyright law you are saying that anyone who violates this law is a criminal, and is potentially subject to very large punishments.
What I am suggesting is that this should not be a legal matter. We should dedicate our works to the Public Domain, via Creative Commons Zero or similar. That doesn’t mean that you necessarily support and encourage anyone to do anything they like with your work. It means that whatever someone does, you will not treat them as a criminal. If you don’t like what they do, contact them and ask them politely to stop. If you would like to issue some guidelines for use, do so. You can ask people to give proper attribution, or to not change anything, or to not use for commercial purposes. But you don’t have to make a legal issue out of these things.
I used to go along with the norm, thinking that it was the right thing to do. So I published my works under restrictive Creative Commons licences. But as I’ve learned more and my understanding of copyright has improved, now I don’t claim anything. I think if someone wants to do something with my work, great. Alexander Duncan of Chroniker Press took my Theragatha translation and made a nice printed edition: it’s terrific, buy one if you like ! Markus Echterhoff of DhammaTime just made some modifications to my Open Sanskrit font, itself derived from Open Sans. Cool, download and use it .
Which brings me back around to something I alluded to earlier. Rather than relying on copyright, we should adapt the millenia-old means of negotiating usage of materials based on social interactions. And this is, once again, an area where technology has completely changed the situation. Creators can stay in touch with their audience to a degree that has not been possible since publishing was invented.
Copyright law is just bad psychology. The people who want your things are your fans. When you invoke copyright law, you are treating your fans like criminals. How do you think that’s going to work out?
The relationship between the creator and their audience is the single, irreducible fact of all public creative activity. You need a creator, and you need an audience. What you don’t need is a middle man. By making a faceless company the middle man, you distance the creator from their audience. When a fan copies a work, they don’t think they are harming the creator. They think of it as avoiding paying “the man”. If the natural creative relationship between artist and audience is restored, there will be a greater degree of respect and mutual support. This is proven by such innovations as Kickstarter, which shows that people are quite happy to pay for creative works, especially if they feel a sense of connection with the creator.
What I am suggesting is that innovative models like Kickstarter, or its Buddhist version dana.io, give us an example of how a new relationship between creator and audience can be forged. Lulu.com, the print on demand service, is another example. Rather than signing over the ownership of your work to Lulu, you retain ownership, and use whatever licence you like. Lulu is more like a contractor. You pay them for various services, basic ones like printing and distribution, and optionally for things like design and marketing. But they never own your work: you do.
Most people don’t realize it, but the internet runs on dana. Most of the servers that power the internet run on Linux, which is Free and Open Source Software. It was created, developed, and is still maintained by people who donate their work to the public good. Linux doesn’t just power the internet, it also underlies Android, and a whole range of other applications, from computers embedded in various devices, to the world’s fastest supercomputers. Why do you think the very best computer scientists in the world use Linux for their most performance-critical work? Because it’s better, obviously. Generosity is not just a nice idea, it creates better outcomes. Why? Because people do better work when you engage their positive nature than if you assume they are selfish.
Another innovative example is the TeX typesetting program developed by Donald Knuth. He released the software for free, as quality typesetting is a public good, everyone should be able to do it. And he made money by putting the detailed instructions in a book, the TeXbook, which was of course typeset in TeX. But he went further, by offering a reward for anyone who found a bug in his program. In this way he not only improved his work, he engaged a community of clever people who wanted to work with him.
There’s lots of other examples to be found. In all these cases, people found effective ways to use a fundamental principle of Buddhist psychology: that people work best when they are encouraged to do good. If you penalize them for doing something harmless, they just get annoyed.
I’ll finish this off with a quote from the author Neil Gaiman , which is a summary of his keynote for the London Book Fair 2013.
 

Mammals spend an awful lot of energy on infants, on children, they spend nine months of our lives gestating, and then they get two decades of attention from us, because we’re putting all of our attention into this one thing we want to grow. Dandelions on the other hand will have thousands of seeds and they let them go where they like, they don’t really care. They will let go of 1,000 seeds, and 100 of them will sprout.
… the whole point of a digital frontier right now is that it’s a frontier, all the old rules are falling apart. Anyone who tells you they know what’s coming, what things will be like in 10 years’ time, is simply lying to you. None of the experts know—nobody knows, which is great.
When the rules are gone you can make up your own rules. You can fail, you can fail more interestingly, you can try things, and you can succeed in ways nobody would have thought of, because you’re pushing through a door marked no entrance, you’re walking in through it. You can do all of that stuff but you just have to become a dandelion, be willing for things to fail, throw things out there, try things, and see what sticks.
 

And, by the way, I fixed a spelling mistake in that quote. One dandelion just became a little more beautiful.

[Johann]

Some quotes that have been saved after the deleting by Sujato:

Hi LLT,

I’ve deleted Johann’s replies as they were becoming spam. Multiple incoherent rants do not a conversation make.

As for learning about taking what is not given and Buddhas ethic, the different between "right" and stealing, you may learn some of Buddhas views .

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession: pieces of land (fields, orchards, building sites), buildings, objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safekeeping. (According to the Commentary, items loaned to a bhikkhu also fall into this category.) According to the Vibhaṅga, if a case of this sort goes to court, this type of taking is completed when the owner finally loses the case. The Vinaya-mukha adds that if the owner appeals the case after the first hearing, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses in the highest court to which he/she makes an appeal.
The discussion in the Commentary and Sub-commentary indicates that the two categories of "objects a bhikkhu has been asked to guard," and "objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safe keeping" differ in that in the latter case the object has been handed to the bhikkhu, whereas in the former it hasn't. This, however, does not fit with the Vibhaṅga, which in defining "deposited" uses the word upanikkhitaṃ, which in NP 18 means "placed down next to." A way to distinguish the two categories more closely in line with the Vibhaṅga would be to say that, in the latter case, the object is in such a location that the owner, in order to retrieve it, would have to ask the bhikkhu's permission to do so, whereas in the former he/she wouldn't. For example, an item placed in the bhikkhu's hut or a monastery storeroom would count as deposited with the bhikkhu — regardless of whether it had been handed to him — whereas an item set by the side of a public road — with the bhikkhu simply asked to watch over it for a short period of time — would count as an object he has been asked to guard.

Shifting a boundary marker: pieces of land. The Vinaya-mukha notes that this contradicts the preceding definition of how one takes a piece of land, as the owner might not even know that the marker had been moved, and would not necessarily give up ownership even if he/she saw a bhikkhu moving it. The Sub-commentary tries to explain the discrepancy by maintaining that shifting a boundary marker fulfils the factor of effort here only if the act of shifting the marker, in and of itself, induces the owner to give up any efforts to reclaim the land, but that would make this category superfluous. A better explanation would be that this definition of taking applies to attempts to lay claim to Saṅgha land, for otherwise — if land can be stolen only when the owner abandons ownership — then Saṅgha land could not be stolen, because there is no one acting for the Saṅgha of the Four Directions who could renounce once and for all any efforts to reclaim the land.

...The Commentary to Mv.I.62 adds that if a bhikkhu claims higher seniority than is actually his in order to obtain better donations, he should be treated under this rule when, through this ruse, he obtains donations that should have gone to another bhikkhu. However, this type of action would appear to fall under Deceit, discussed below.
....Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of land: all steps us to laying claim to the land: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner's mind as to whether he/she will lose the land: a thullaccaya. Again, if the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.

Shifting a boundary marker: all steps up through removing the boundary marker from its original place: dukkaṭas. Any steps between that and putting the boundary marker in a new place: thullaccayas.

Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: all steps up through touching the object with the intent of taking it out of the customs area: dukkaṭas. Making the object move without fully moving it from the customs area: a thullaccaya.

many more...
...and very important here

The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Saṅgha. In the origin story to Pr 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Saṅgha's heavy property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.

"There’s hardly a single computer user who hasn’t faced the possibility of using or creating content that infringes copyright."... so the thief likes to lighten the laws instead to train one self in precepts and urge others to do. Atma was wondering why somebody would reject a gift, put such is usual if one feels caught and so he seeks for ways to make his deeds legal afterwards.

So try to make it better, that is actually good. Translate and share and do not get into business involved. Mr/Mrs LTT. There is an in between of restriction and unscrupulousness (pamada), and this is called generosity and gratitude: and here are some basic lessons or Sensitivity through Generosity
Such as rights has no foothold in Buddhas teachings and a claim after it no foothold in his Path.

Its not easy to understand the different between generosity and claim as I see... Its good, to give. Try it, if it is yours.

Samana prefers Dhamma and if you would know the copyrights and ethics where Samana is coming from, you would think childs start to think. Of course for modern time nothing makes sense as people prefer to claim and not to get their minds under control. That is what is called endless greed and still they will not be satisfied, eating the world and the whole heritage and after forgotten, no place for gratitude by plenty place to claim. Not understand this world, rights and laws but seeking for advocates to get their aims. Poorness has its reason.

here above the response

Samana Johann, I think you need to learn a little about the history of copyright, rather than making spurious claims about “ownership” and stealing. Copyright is not ownership, but rather a special set of rights and restrictions that did not even exist until recently in history. For nearly all of Buddhist history, the contents of a text were not covered under copyright at all. In fact, all works made 100+ years ago are no longer eligible for copyright.

Getting rid of copyright is actually getting rid of special exclusive rights for authors that no longer make sense in the modern world. Doing this is actually a form of giving and generosity (giving to the entire world), because everyone stands to benefit from it. It also helps the works to achieve greater circulation. Would the Buddha be against his own teachings being free? Certainly not — they were already free during his own time, and for over 2000 years after that! Why would someone want to lock up his words and claim ownership? Not out of charity…

The idea that we artificially restrict circulation because someone somewhere owns the Buddha’s words, is quite absurd. As long as society still accepts copyright, we also must accept it, but publishing translations without copyright (in the first place) is the better way. This allows distribution at the speed of modern technology, without all the unnecessary legal restrictions and red tape.

earlier have been deleted and can not be restored.

[Johann]

serval additional post have been deleted...

Samana Johann
can you specify who stole what to be dubbed a thief?

Deleting counts as destruction and is not only from a Vinaya view an offense but also a violation of basic right. Here in this regard it would be protected as under authors' right. Sujato was taught this already in April 2013 , but neither does he feel to be subject of common laws and ethics nor does he stick to Vinaya. A thief and even worse, a notoriety repeat offender. Not to speak about his "bigger" undertakings and encouragements to steeling.

Here the “soft” case:

   

Compensation owed. The Commentary introduces the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another person’s property. It defines this concept by saying that the bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if the owner gives up his/her efforts to receive compensation, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika. The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.